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The Sandelian Republic and
the Encumbered Self
Richard Dagger
In Democracy's Discontent, Michael Sandel argues for a revival of the
republican tradition in order to counteractthe pernicious effects of contemporary
liberalism. As in his earlier work, Sandel charges that liberals who embrace the
ideals of political neutrality and the unencumbered self are engaged in a selfsubverting enterprise, for no society that lives by these ideals can sustain itself.
Sandel is right to endorse the republican emphasis on forming citizens and
cultivating civic virtues. By opposing liberalismas vigorously as he does, however,
he engages in a self-subverting enterprise of his own. That is, Sandel is in danger
of undercutting his position by threatening the liberal principles upon which he
implicitly relies. This danger is greatest when he presses his case against the
unencumbered self, when he appeals to the obligations of membership, and when
he treats republicanism and liberalism as adversaries rather than allies.

In the 1980s Michael Sandel established himself as a leading
critic of liberalism. His Liberalismand theLimitsofJustice,published
in 1982, almost in tandem with Alasdair MacIntyre'sAfter Virtue,
helped to launch the communitarian challenge to liberalism.1Two
years later he published a collection of essays, Liberalismand Its
Critics,and an influential article, "The Procedural Republic and
the Unencumbered Self," in which he argued that the defects of
contemporary liberalism had seeped from theory into practice in
the United States.2Ideas have consequences, he insisted, and the
James Farr'sinvitation to participate in a panel on "Sandel and His Critics"
prompted me to write this paper and present an earlier version of it at the 1998
meeting of Midwest Political Science Association. I am grateful to Professor Farr
and to Terence Ball, the anonymous referees for The Reviewof Politics, and my
colleagues in the ASUMPL reading group, especially Avital Simhony, for their
advice and encouragement.
1. Michael Sandel, Liberalismand theLimitsof Justice(Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press, 1982;2nd ed. 1998);AlasdairMacIntyre,AfterVirtue(Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). Further references to Liberalismand
the Limitsof Justiceappear in the text, in parentheses, as LLJ.
2. Michael Sandel, ed., Liberalism
andIts Critics(Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1984);
Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," PoliticalTheory
12 (1984): 81-96, and reprinted in Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds.,
Communitarianism
and Individualism(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1992), pp.
12-28, from which I shall quote. Furtherreferences to "The Procedural Republic
and the Unencumbered Self" appear in the text, in parentheses, as "PR."
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misguided ideas of contemporary liberals have had the consequence of weakening the American polity. "This is the sense,"
Sandel wrote, "in which philosophy inhabits the world from
the start; our practices and institutions are embodiments of
theory" ("PR,"p. 12).
Those same words appear in the preface to Professor Sandel's
new book, Democracy'sDiscontent:America in Searchof a Public
Philosophy.3Indeed, the first two sentences of "The Procedural
Republic and the Unencumbered Self" are also the first two sentences of the preface to Democracy'sDiscontent.These are but the
first of many signs that Democracy'sDiscontentis "The Procedural
Republic"writ large-an attempt to fill out the picture of our procedural republic that he had sketched in the article. Thus Sandel
devotes most of the book to the historical enterprise of tracing the
ways in which "the civic or formative aspect of our politics has
largely given way to the liberalism that conceives persons as free
and independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties they
have not chosen" (DD, p. 6). The historical detail is new, but the
fundamental complaint is the same in the book as it was in the
article: "The public philosophy by which we live cannot secure
the liberty it promises, because it cannot inspire the sense of
community and civic engagement that libertyrequires"(DD, p. 6).4
But that is not to say that the historical detail is the only new
element in Democracy'sDiscontent.Another is Sandel's adherence
to republicanism, which occupies the favorable side of a contrast
between republicanism and liberalism that is the leitmotifof the
book. Although he never explains why he now associates himself
with the republican rather than the communitarian position, the
answer is probably to be found in a remark from his review of
John Rawls's Political Liberalism:"The term 'communitarian' is
misleading ... insofar as it implies that rights should rest on the
values or preferences that prevail in any given community at any
given time. Few, if any, of those who have challenged the priority
3. Michael Sandel, Democracy'sDiscontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. ix. Further
references to this book appear in the text, in parentheses, as DD.
4. Cp. "ProceduralRepublic":"ButI suspect we would find in the practiceof
the procedural republic two broad tendencies foreshadowed by its philosophy:
first, a tendency to crowd out democratic possibilities; second, a tendency to
undercut the kind of community on which it none the less depends" (p. 27).
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of the right are communitarians in this sense."5To be sure, Sandel
continues to challenge the priority of the right to the good, as the
22 entries under this heading in the index attest. But he apparently
believes that he is in a better position to do this as a republican
committed to "a formative politics ... that cultivates in citizens

the qualities of character self-government requires" than as a
communitarian committed to the prevailing values and
preferences in a given community at a given time (DD, p. 6). After
all, those values and preferences may foster ambition, avarice,
sloth, and other qualities of characterquite different from, or even
hostile to, those that self-government requires. As a republican,
then, Sandel may be able to resist the charge that he is one of the
"communitarian critics" of liberalism who "want us to live in
Salem, but not to believe in witches."6
Sandel's self-professed republicanism also points to another
respect in which Democracy'sDiscontentadds something new to
the arguments of "TheProceduralRepublic."By taking republican
theory and practice as the standard against which liberalism is
measured and found wanting, Sandel now tells us, by implication,
what he takes to be an adequate political theory-one that is truly
capable of providing a public philosophy to inform our political
practices and institutions. In his final chapter, moreover, he
provides an account of how we can revive civic life that includes
prescriptions for fighting Walmart-induced sprawl and reducing
economic inequality. The account is far from complete, as he
acknowledges, but it does offer more than a hint of what a
Sandelian republic of encumbered selves would look like.
Those who want to know what Sandel is for as well as what
he is against thus have good reason to welcome Democracy's
Discontent. If they believe that American politics would benefit
from a bracing (not to say liberal) dose of republicanism, they
will also find much that is salutary in the book. As someone who
counts himself in both of these camps, I believe that Professor
Sandel has been wise to put some distance between himself and
5. Michael Sandel, "Political Liberalism," HarvardLaw Review 107, no. 7
(1994): 1767.
6. Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism,"Philosophyand
Public Affairs 14 (1985): 308-22, as reprinted in Avineri and de-Shalit,
Communitarianism
andIndividualism,p. 133.In this regard,note Sandel's admission
(Democracy'sDiscontent,p. 321) that "badcommunities may form bad characters."
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communitarianism, and wiser still to endorse the republican
emphasis on forming citizens and cultivating civic virtues. But
he is wrong to continue to oppose liberalism as vigorously as he
does, and he is particularly wrong to oppose republicanism to
liberalism. By doing so he opens himself to a charge that he has
leveled against those liberals who have embraced the ideals of
political neutrality and the unencumbered self: that they are
engaged in a self-subverting enterprise. Just as a liberal society
must be able to count on a sense of community and civic
engagement, so the republican polity that Sandel now champions
must be able to count on a commitment to liberal principles, such
as tolerance, fair play, and respect for the rights of others. If their
zeal for individual rights and liberty sometimes leads liberals to
undercut their position by threateningthe communal or republican
underpinnings of a liberal society, so Sandel is in danger of
undercutting his position by threatening the liberal principles
upon which he implicitly relies. This danger is greatest, I shall
argue, when Sandel presses his case against the unencumbered
self, when he appeals to the obligations of membership, and when
he opposes republicanism to liberalism.

Sandel and the Self
According to the argument of Liberalismand the Limitsof Justice, one of the fundamental flaws of deontological liberals in
general and John Rawls in particular is the doctrine that the self is
prior to its ends. As Sandel restated Rawls's position, this doctrine holds that "what is most essential to our personhood is not
the ends we choose but our capacity to choose them. And this
capacity is located in a self which must be prior to the ends it
chooses" (LLJ,p. 19). Following a substantial quotation from
Rawls'sA Theoryof ustice,Sandelelaboratedthe doctrinein this way:
To identify any set of characteristics as my aims, ambitions, desires, and
so on, is always to imply some subject 'me' standing behind them, and
the shape of this 'me' must be given prior to any of the ends or attributes
I bear.As Rawls writes,'even a dominant end must be chosen from among
numerous possibilities.' And before an end can be chosen, there must be
a self around to choose it. (LLJ,p. 19; emphasis in original)7
7. The internal quotation is from John Rawls, A Theoryof Justice(Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 560.
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Sandel then went on to argue that this view of the self as choosing subject prior to its chosen ends is both wrong and pernicious.
It is wrong because its conception of the self as static and isolated
is at odds with our self-knowledge, and it is pernicious because
the distance it puts between self and world forecloses important
personal and political possibilities. "One consequence of this distance," he charged,
is to put the self beyond the reachof experience,to makeit invulnerable,
to fix its identity once and for all. No commitmentcould grip me so
deeply thatI could not understandmyself without it. No transformation
of life purposesandplanscouldbe so unsettlingas to disruptthe contours
of my identity.No projectcould be so essentialthatturningaway fromit
would call into question the person I am. (LLJ,p. 62)

Such a self must be disconnected from other people, cut off from
a community or communities that give it shape, substance, and
texture. Conceiving the self as prior to its ends thus "rules out the
possibility of a public life in which, for good or ill, the identity as
well as the interests of the participants could be at stake" (LLJ,p.
62).8 So abstract and disembodied a self must also be shallow,
"incapableof self-knowledge in any morally serious sense. Where
the self is unencumbered and essentially dispossessed, no person
is left for self-reflection to reflect upon" (LLJ,p. 180; emphasis
in original).
These objections to the doctrine of the self as prior to its ends
recur in "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self."
There,however, the emphasis is on the pernicious effects of taking
the self to be unencumbered-effects that have become all too
evident in the "proceduralrepublic"of the United States. Because
it is a republic, the procedural republic must rely upon the loyalty
of citizens who are committed to the common good. But because
it draws upon a conception of the self as unencumbered, free from
"moralencumbrancesand antecedent obligations,"the procedural
republic is caught in a contradiction, for an unencumbered self is
incapable of sustaining the necessary loyalty and commitment
("PR," p. 23). Can we view ourselves, Sandel asked, as
"independent in the sense that our identity is never tied to our
aims and attachments?"Not, he answered,
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without cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists
partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding
ourselves as the particular persons we are-as members of this family
or community or nation or people, as bearers of that history, as citizens
of this republic. Allegiances such as these are more than values I happen
to have, and to hold, at a certain distance. They go beyond the obligations
I voluntarily incur and the 'natural duties' I owe to human beings as
such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or even
permits, not by reason of agreements I have made but instead in virtue
of those more or less enduring attachments and commitments that, taken
together, partly define the person I am. ("PR," p. 23)9

In short, the self-identity of the encumbered self sustains
republican government by teaching the individual that he or she
is entangled in a network of unchosen attachments and
commitments; the self-identity of the unencumbered self
undercuts republican government by teaching the individual that
he or she is subjectonly to obligations freely chosen. Toheed those
philosophers who tell us that the self is prior to its ends is thus to
follow mistaken theory into self-defeating practice. "Denied the
expansive self-understandings that could shape a common life,
the liberal self is left to lurchbetween detachment on the one hand,
and entanglement on the other." If this "liberal vision" is "not
morally self-sufficient but parasitic on a notion of community it
officially rejects, then we should expect to find that the political
practice that embodies this vision is not practicallyself-sufficient
either-that it must draw on a sense of community it cannot
supply and may even undermine"("PR,"p. 24;emphasisin original).
That this is "the predicament of the unencumbered selflurching, as we left it, between detachment on the one hand, and
entanglement on the other," is the principal point of "The
Procedural Republic." That "something like this ... has been

unfolding in America for the past half-century or so" is the worry
that concludes the essay ("PR,"p. 28). Democracy'sDiscontentis
Sandel's attempt to prove that we do indeed have reason to worry
about the predicament of the unencumbered self.
In Democracy'sDiscontentthe claim that it is both wrong and
pernicious to conceive the self as prior to its ends is again at the
heart of Sandel's analysis and argument. "In recent decades," he
writes on page six, "the civic or formative aspect of our politics
9. Cp. ibid.,p. 179.
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has largely given way to the liberalism that conceives persons as
free and independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties
they have not chosen." He makes the same point on page 350, the
penultimate page of the text: "the image of citizens as free and
independent selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties that they
have not chosen, cannot sustain the public spirit that equips us
for self-rule." Variations on this theme recur throughout the intervening pages, especially when Sandel revisits Rawlsiana: "As
Rawls explained, it is precisely because we are free and independent selves, capable of choosing our ends for ourselves, that we
need a framework of rights that is neutral among ends.... As the
right is prior to the good, so the self is prior to its ends" (DD, p.
290 and 291).
If Sandel's criticisms of this conception of the self are correctif it does indeed lead us into the "predicament of the
unencumbered self" ensnared in a self-defeating enterprise-we
shall then have a compelling reason to look favorably upon the
Sandelian republic and its encumbered self. But is he right? Does
the belief that the self is prior to its ends take us inexorably into
the predicament of the unencumbered self? If it does, it is not for
the reasons Sandel gives.
There are three ways in which Sandel's case against the unencumbered self conceived as prior to its ends fails. The first has to
do with the justice of Sandel's assessment of Rawls and the other
"deontological," "procedural,"or "voluntarist"liberals who hold
that the self is prior to its ends. As we have seen, Sandel argues
that they are wrong because their view of the self is impoverished
and inaccurate;it cannot account for our sense of ourselvesas "selfinterpreting" and "self-reflective" beings: "Where the self is
unencumbered and essentially dispossessed, no person is left for
self-reflection to reflect upon" (LLJ,p. 180; emphasis in original).
But there is a vast difference between saying that the self is prior
to its ends and saying that it is unencumbered. As Will Kymlicka
explains in his response to Sandel,
What is central to the liberal view is not that we can perceivea self prior
to its ends, but that we understand our selves to be prior to our ends, in
the sense that no end or goal is exemptfrom possible re-examination. ... My
self is, in this sense, perceived prior to its ends, i.e. I can always envisage
my self without its present ends. But this doesn't require that I can ever
perceive a self totally unencumbered by any ends-the process of ethical
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reasoning is always one of comparing one "encumbered" potential self
with another "encumbered" potential self.10

According to Sandel's criticism, the self as Rawls and other
deontological liberals conceive it is something that exists prior to
its ends and attachments, all form and no substance until it constitutes itself by choosing among the ends and attachments
available to it. If this were the Rawlsian liberal's conception of the
self, it surely would be as mistaken as Sandel charges. Kymlicka's
response demonstrates, however, that Sandel's criticism is misplaced. When Rawls and other liberals hold that the self is prior
to its ends, their point is not that the self precedes its ends in time.
The claim is not temporal but conceptual. That is, the self is prior
to its ends in that no self is completely defined or exhausted by its
ends. If I were somehow to compile a comprehensive catalogue
of my ends, commitments, and attachments, for example, that
catalogue would no doubt provide a remarkablybroad and deep
account of who I am: of myself.Yet it would not and could not
capture everything about my self, for it would not include my
(self's) ability to add new items to that catalogue while amending
or discarding others. The self is prior to its ends in this conceptual
sense, then, even if some of its ends and attachments necessarily
precede it in the temporal sense.
This is clearly an important response to Sandel's criticism of
the (supposedly) liberal conception of the self-constituted self. It
is especially important in light of Sandel's continued assault in
Democracy'sDiscontent on "the liberal conception of citizens as
freely choosing, independent selves, unencumbered by moral or
civic ties antecedent to choice" (DD, p. 322). That Sandel neglects
to respond in turn to Kymlicka's response is, as one reviewer of
Democracy'sDiscontenthas noted, signally disappointing.11
10. Kymlicka, Liberalism,Community,and Culture(Oxford:Clarendon Press,
1989), pp. 52-53. See also John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism(New York:Columbia
University Press, 1993),p. 27 and n. 29, where Rawls endorses Kymlicka'sresponse
to Sandel.
11.Daniel A. Bell, "LiberalNeutrality and Its Role in American PoliticalLife,"
TheResponsiveCommunity7 (1997):61-68, esp. p. 62. Nor does Sandel respond to
Kymlicka or other critics in the second edition of LiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice
(cited supra,n. 1), which adds an introduction consisting largely of his review of
Rawls's PoliticalLiberalismto the original edition.
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Setting aside the question of the accuracy of Sandel's reading
of Rawls and company, it is also clear that Sandel's discussion of
the self suffers from a second, closely-related problem. This is his
tendency to conflate two distinct senses of "self" and "subject"
and to slide back and forth between them. The first conception is
abstractand general;the second is particularand concrete.
A conception of the self is abstractandgeneralwhen it tries to
capture the features common to all selves; it is concreteand particularwhen it refers to features that vary from one self to another.
Theself-the self in the abstract, general sense-is always a part,
but never the whole, of the particular self that I or you or anyone
else has. The concrete, particular self is a self that is distinct from
everyone else's. Self-knowledge, self-identity, and self-reflection
are all properties of particular, concrete selves, not of the self in
general. Drawing this distinction thus allows us to say that the
self is conceptually prior to its ends even though a self-indeed,
every particular self-is defined or constituted, at least in part,
by them.
This, I take it, is Rawls's position. But it also seems to be
Sandel's. Or perhaps I should say that it is the position that Sandel
needs to take to make sense of some of his arguments. When he
speaks of the constitutive conception of community, for instance,
he is careful to insert the word "partly" at key points: "on the
constitutive conception, the good of community was seen to
penetrate the person more profoundly [than on the sentimental
conception] so as to describe not just his feeling but a mode of
self-understanding partly constitutive of his identity, partly
defininitive [sic] of who he was" (LLJ,p. 161; emphasis added to
"partly"). The same caution is evident when Sandel points to
"those more or less enduring attachments and commitments that,
taken together, partly define the person I am" ("PR," p. 23;
emphasis added). Inserting "partly" in these passages seems to
be Sandel's way of preserving an active role for the self. I am only
partlydefined by my community or by my attachments because I
am able to reject some practices of the community or to grow out
of some of my attachments while taking on others. Someone so
thoroughly absorbed into the ways of his or her community as to
be unable to think beyond its confines will not be capable of the
self-reflection and self-understanding that Sandel takes to be the
hallmark of moral depth or seriousness: "As a self-interpreting
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being, I am able to reflecton my history and in this sense to distance
myselffromit, but the distance is always precariousand provisional,
the point of reflection never finally secured outside the history
itself" (LLJ;emphasis added).
In all of these cases Sandel relies implicitly on the distinction
between the general and the particular senses of the self. As particular selves, that is, we are constituted by community and by
unchosen attachments, but we are never wholly constituted by
them. We cannot be, for there is a sense in which a part of any
particular self is always somehow above or beyond or not contained in that self's ends, attachments,and commitments. Whether
it be marked by a capacity to choose, as in Rawls, or a capacity to
reflect, as Sandel prefers,12this aspect of the self-the abstract,
general self-plays an active part in the constitution of a concrete,
particular self. Indeed, Sandel's description of the capacity for
reflection bears out this point.
Unlike the capacity for choice, which enables the self to reach beyond
itself, the capacity for reflection enables the self to turn its lights inward
upon itself, to inquire into its constituent nature, to survey its various
attachments and to acknowledge their respective claims, to sort out the
bounds-now expansive, now constrained-between the self and the
other, to arrive at a self-understanding less opaque if never perfectly
transparent, a subjectivity less fluid if never finally fixed, and so
gradually, throughout a lifetime, to participate in the constitution of its
identity. (LLJ,p. 153; emphasis added)

The capacity for reflection that Sandel writes of here is plainly
different from the reflective capacity of a mirror.The self that engages in Sandelian self-reflection must exercisejudgment, perhaps
by deciding which of two conflicting attachments is more vital to
itself, or perhaps by sorting out the bounds-where they are and
where they should be-between itself and various others. Even
self-discovery, as in Elizabeth Bennet's "Tillthis moment, I never
knew myself," requires a self capable of self-criticism.13And none

12. But note that Rawls also stresses the importance of self-reflection: "each
person must decide by rational reflection what constitutes his good, that is, the
system of ends which it is rational for him to pursue" (A Theoryof Justice,p. 11).
13. Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice,ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1932), p. 208.
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of this is possible unless we can distinguish between two aspects
or senses of the self.
Sandel's embrace of republicanism in Democracy'sDiscontent
provides further evidence of his implicit reliance on a distinction
of this sort. A republican living in Salem will be more likely to
stand against the witch-hunting fervor than a communitarian.
"Fundamentalists rush in where liberals fear to tread," but a
republican revival may stem the tide (DD, p. 322). Republicanism
can do this because republicans aspire to self-government, and
self-government requires the citizen to participate in making the
laws that he or she is to obey. And making laws requires those
active, critical capacities of reflection and judgment that may call
our communities' norms and our personal attachments into
question. This is especially true of Sandel's "pluralist version of
republican politics," which rests on the conviction that "selfgovernment works best when sovereignty is dispersed and
citizenship formed across multiple sites of civic engagements"
(DD, p. 347). If self-government works best in such circumstances,
it is probably because the tug of war between the claims of our
fellow citizens in these multiple sites of civic engagement forces
us to reflect on their relative merits and to judge-and perhaps to
choose-between them.
Sandel is a republican rather than a communitarian because
he prizes the citizen and the self that are capable of selfgovernment. Such a citizen and such a self need not, and for Sandel
cannot, be wholly self-constituting, but they must be able "to
participate in the constitution of [their] identity" as citizen and as
self. But none of this requires us to rejectthe claim that the self (in
the abstract, general sense) is prior to its ends. On the contrary,
even Sandel, as I hope to have shown, implicitly appeals to this
sense in which the self stands apart from and reflects upon its
current ends and attachments.
There is an irony here. For if I am right, one may conceive the
self as prior to its ends and nevertheless deplore the unencumbered
self. The self that is prior to its ends is the self in the abstract,
general sense, and to say that it is prior to its ends tells us little
about particular selves. Sandel may then implicitly rely on a
conception of the self that is prior to its ends, as I have suggested,
yet continue to attack what he takes to be the liberal celebration
and cultivation of unencumbered selves (in the particular,concrete
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sense) without contradicting himself. Indeed, he could admit to
being mistaken about the priority of the self to its ends without
retreating at all from his criticism of "the liberal conception of
persons as unencumbered selves independent of their roles and
unbound by moral ties they choose to reject" (DD, p. 112). His
task would then be to prove, first, that liberalism does indeed
produce such unencumbered selves and, second, that these selves
(in the particular, concrete sense) are indeed incapable of
sustaining the loyalty and commitment that republican selfgovernment requires.
I am prepared to concede Sandel the second point, but not the
first. Some of the reasons for my disagreement will appear below,
in Part III,but for now I want to challenge his account of encumbered and unencumbered selves. For this is the third respect in
which Sandel's criticism of the unencumbered self conceived as
prior to its ends is off the mark.
In this case the problem is that Sandel trades on a false
dichotomy between encumbered and unencumbered selves. As
Sandel insists, the liberal imageof the unencumbered self is false
and misleading because no self (in the particular,concrete sense)
can truly be unencumbered. We all derive some substantial part
of our identities from communities and attachmentsthat somehow
encumber us. So it is not the unencumbered self that is the problem,
but the pernicious belief that we can or should become
unencumbered. That is why Sandel decries "the liberal conception
of citizens as freely choosing, independent selves, unencumbered
by moral or civic ties antecedent to choice";that is why he deplores
"the voluntarist project of contemporary liberalism," according
to which "the idealAmerican citizen would think and act as a kind
of universal person, unencumbered by particular identities and
attachments" (DD, p. 322, p. 283; emphasis added to both
quotations). People who are encouraged to believe, by political
rhetoric and legal decisions, that they are truly unencumbered
selves will try to live as if they were, with results that can only be
disastrous for republican self-government.
But if the image or ideal or conception of the unencumbered
self is false and misleading because there can be no such self (in
the particular, concrete sense), then the dichotomy between the
encumbered and unencumbered self must also be false. Rather
than posing the problem as a choice between two competing
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conceptions of the self, encumbered or unencumbered, as Sandel
does, we should recognize that all selves (in the particular,concrete
sense) must be encumbered to a greater or lesser degree. Sandel
might respond that it is still worthwhile to draw a distinction
between the encumbered and unencumbered selves as ideals.Yet
even as an ideal the self he calls unencumbered is really only a
less thoroughly or more lightly encumbered self. We are dealing
with a continuum, not a dichotomy. Somewhere between the
impossibly unencumbered self and the self so completely
encumbered that it is unable to engage in critical reflection lies
the properly encumbered self-one that is capable of thinking
freely and independently without ignoring or disavowing what
it has gained from and owes to others. Locating the space in which
that properly encumbered self can thrive should be a central
concern of all those who advocate self-government, liberals and
republicans alike.
Drawing a sharp distinction between encumbered and
unencumbered selves, as Sandel does, directs our attention away
from this central concern. It leads him, for example, to associate
autonomy with the liberal image of the unencumbered self when
he clearly needs to enlist it on the side of his republicanism. To be
autonomous is to be in some sense self-governing, subject to laws
or rules that one gives to oneself. When he places autonomy on
the liberal side of his encumbered/unencumbered dichotomy,
however, Sandel seems to imply that the encumbered selves on
his republican side must be characterized by heteronomy. "For
the unencumbered self, not honor but dignity is the basis of
respect-the dignity that consists in the capacity of persons as
autonomous agents to choose their ends for themselves" (DD, p.
82). By implication, then, the encumbered self must find its basis
of respect not in dignity but in honor-the honor that consists in
playing the part of heteronomous beings who have their ends
chosen for them.
But that cannot be what Sandel, as a self-professed republican, means by the encumbered self. Such a self must be capable,
in concertwith others,of self-government, and in that sense such a
self must be autonomous. As with encumbered and unencumbered selves, autonomy and heteronomy are not the two sides of
a dichotomy. Autonomy is a matter of degree, something that one
may enjoy to a greater or lesser extent. It is also something that
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the self (in the particular,concrete sense) does not acquire all on
its own, for it is a capacity that must be developed with the help
of others before it can be exercised.14But it must be exercisedif
self-government is to be possible.
To this complaint Sandel or his defenders could reply that his
attack on the liberal conception of autonomy need not entail a
commitment to heteronomy.15Instead, Sandel's criticism could be
aimed at what he takes to be a misconception of autonomy that
stands in need of correction. Sandel might then have his own,
republican conception of autonomy-the autonomy of the encumbered self that governs itself in the full awareness of how much it
owes to the community that partly constitutes its identity-to offer as a superior alternative to liberal autonomy. If something of
this sort does lie behind Sandel's criticism of liberal autonomy in
Democracy'sDiscontent,however, it is obscured by Sandel's persistent association of autonomy with the errors of voluntarist or
procedural liberalism. As matters now stand, his republicanism,
with its implicit appeal to a conception of autonomy, is at odds
with his indictment of such "comprehensive liberal ideals as autonomy or individuality" (DD, p. 100).
Sandel's tendency to link autonomy to the liberal image of
the free, independent, and unencumbered self is an example of
the larger problems of his analysis of the self. For this "liberal
image" is not one that Rawls and Rawlsian liberals have adopted
as an account of the particular, concrete self; nor does it follow
from the claim that the self in the abstract, general sense is prior
to its ends; nor does it provide one side of a dichotomy between
autonomous and unencumbered selves, on the one hand, and
heteronomous and encumbered selves, on the other. The encumbered self may be at the heart of Sandel's vision of a self-governing
republic, but it must be a self that is properly encumbered, capable of critical reflection and judgment, and autonomous in the
sense of being able to participate in the government of the repub14. I develop this conception in "Politics and the Pursuit of Autonomy,"
NOMOS XXVIII:Justificationin Politics, ed. J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman
(New York: New York University Press, 1986), and in Civic Virtues: Rights,
Citizenship,and RepublicanLiberalism(New York:Oxford University Press, 1997),
esp. chap. 3.
15. I owe this point to two anonymous reviewers for the Reviewof Politics.
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lic. A self that is incapable of reconsidering its ends and attachments, subjecting them to scrutiny, and revising or even rejecting
them simply could not handle the burdens of deliberation that
Sandel's "multiply-situated selves" and "multiply-encumbered
citizens" must bear (DD, p. 350).

Loyalty, Solidarity, and the Problem of Obligation
Encumbered or not, Sandelian citizens must be able to thinkand to choose-for themselves. If this is not already evident,
consideration of Sandel's views on the obligations of membership
should make the point plain.
One of the failings of "the image of the unencumbered self,"
according to Sandel, is that it "cannot make sense of our
experience, because it cannot account for certain moral and
political obligations that we commonly recognize, even prize.
These include obligations of solidarity, religious duties, and other
moral ties that may claim us for reasons unrelated to a choice"
(DD, p. 13). The liberal emphasis on individuals who freely choose
to place themselves under obligations may account for obligations
arising from contractsand other voluntary agreements;it may even
accommodatethe "naturalduties,"as Rawls calls them, that we owe
to everyone, remote stranger as well as neighbor or kin. But this
liberal attempt to construe all obligation in terms of duties universally
owed or obligations voluntarily incurred makes it difficult to account
for civic obligations and other moral and political ties that we commonly
recognize. It fails to capture those loyalties and responsibilities whose
moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable
from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are-as
members of this family or city or nation or people, as bearers of that
history, as citizens of this republic. Loyalties such as these can be more
than values I happen to have, and to hold, at a certain distance. The
moral responsibilities they entail may go beyond the obligations I
voluntarily incur and the "natural duties" I owe to human beings as
such. (DD, p. 14)16

Although he does not delve far into these matters, Sandel
plainly believes that membership and identity are sufficient to
16. Cp. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 179, and "Procedural
Republic," p. 23.
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groundmany obligations,including"certainmoraland political

obligations that we commonly recognize, even prize." In arguing
for these "obligations of membership" or "obligations of solidarity," he places himself in company that includes at least two
Whether that
professed liberals, Ronald Dworkin and YaelTamir.17
means that the appeal to loyalty is not the threat to liberalism
Sandel takes it to be or that some liberal thinkers have seen the
light and have moved in a Sandelian direction is a question I shall
not address here, save to note that one can apparently move in a
Sandelian direction without forsaking liberalism. Instead, I shall
argue that Sandel's appeal to obligations of solidarity is in one
way right, but in another quite wrong.
Sandel is right to point out that loyalty and the sense of
obligation are important moral and political concerns. Anyone
who has ever condemned parents who abandon their children or
criticized children who ignore their aged and infirm parents will
agree that some of our responsibilities are simply not chosen.
Anyone who has ever tried to stir people to action or to rally them
to confront a challenge knows that a sense of belonging, of
common membership in the group, is vital to success. A republic
in which this sense of solidarity or obligation is weak, to put the
point in terms of Sandel's political concerns, must be weak itself.
So it is indeed important to foster and cultivate this sense of
identification and loyalty among the citizens.
Sandel goes wrong, however, when he takes the sense of
obligation for the obligationitself. Someone may have a sense of
obligation, even a powerful sense of obligation, without truly
being under the obligation in question. In Dickens's Martin
Chuzzlewit,for example, Seth Pecksniff's assistant, TomPinch, feels

17. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1986), pp. 186-216; Yael Tamir,LiberalNationalism(Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993), chaps. 5 and 6. See also: Margaret Gilbert, "Group
Membership and Political Obligation," The Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael
Hardimon, "Role Obligations," TheJournalof Philosophy91 (1994):333-63; John
Horton, Political Obligation (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press
International, 1992), chap. 6; and Bhikhu Parekh, "Citizenship and Political
Obligation," in Socialismand the CommonGood:New FabianEssays, ed. Preston
King (London:FrankCass, 1996),pp. 259-89. For criticism, see A. John Simmons,
"Associative Political Obligations," Ethics 106 (1996): 247-73, and Christopher
Heath Wellman,"AssociativeAllegiances and PoliticalObligations,"SocialTheory
and Practice23 (1997): 181-204.
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an overwhelming obligation to Pecksniff,when all along Pecksniff
is shamelessly exploiting Tom'sinnocent good nature. Conversely,
someone may be subject to an obligation that he or she has no
sense of at all. A man who fathers a child without knowing it
provides a case in point, for he has an obligation to the child and
its mother, ceterisparibus,even though he has absolutely no sense
of this obligation. From either direction, the difference between
the sense of obligation and the obligation itself undercuts the
argument from membership or identification. The fact that people
feel themselves to be under an obligation to their polity does not
mean that they are under such an obligation, nor does the fact
that they feel no such obligation mean that they are not.
This appeal to the senseof obligation is especially troublesome
for Sandel because it threatens his attempt to distance himself
from communitarians who are willing to accept "the values or
preferences that prevail in any given community at any given
time."'8As a republican, Sandel must acknowledge that the values or preferences of some communities are hostile to the
republican ideal of self-government. When he invokes the claims
of membership, identity, and solidarity, however, he seems to say
that anyone who feels a sense of obligation to any group or community, no matter how despotic or exploitative it may be, does
indeed have an obligation to that group or community. He does
admit, as previously noted, that "bad communities may form bad
characters," but he has no recommendation for handling those
whose "bad characters"lead them to believe that they ought to
be loyal to their "bad communities."
To be sure, Sandel does not insist that these obligations of
membership and solidarity are absolute. Presumably they may
be overridden by more pressing moral and political claims. But
how are we to know what these more pressing claims are? The
appeal to membership and solidarity by itself offers no criteria
for weighing or discriminating between competing claims. What
seems to matter most is the degree to which one identifies with
this group or community in comparison with that group or community, as in Sandel's example of Robert E. Lee choosing to stand
by "'my native State and share the miseries of my people.'"'9 But
18. Sandel, "Political Liberalism," p. 1767.
19. As quoted in Democracy's Discontent, p. 15.
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how was Lee to determine that Virginia rather than the United
States was his true country?His sense of loyalty resolved the question in favor of Virginia, but the subsequent creation of West
Virginiaindicates that other Virginiansevidently found their sympathies pulling them in the other direction. Should he even have
given his "native State" such weight in light of its reliance on the
vicious practice of slavery? Even if we acknowledge that Lee did
have an obligation of solidarity to his "people," it is by no means
clear that he should have given such weight to a "native State"
that endorsed such a practice.
The point, then, is that the sense of obligation is indeed important, but this sense is neither the sole nor a sufficient guide to
proper conduct. Solidarity and loyalty are good things in the same
way that the disposition to follow orders is a good thing. When
the members of a group are engaged in a cooperative enterprise
that seems to contribute to the good of the members, at least in
the long term, then solidarity and loyalty help to reinforce the
cooperation necessary to the group's success. But when the group
relies on indoctrination and manipulation to provide benefits to
some at the expense of the systematic exploitation of others, solidarity and loyalty may simply perpetuate the injustice. The sense
of obligation may be important, but not as important as the obligation itself.
A theory of political obligation, in particular, requires more
than the appeal to membership and solidarity can provide.
Following Locke's observation in the SecondTreatiseof Government
(?211) that the government may be dissolved without dissolving
the society, one can easily admit to membership in a community
or society without acknowledging an obligation to obey the
commands of those who hold power. Those who engage in civil
disobedience do not have to renounce their citizenship or admit
to being disloyal, for they may claim that they are holding the
rest of the community to its own ideals. Or they may even claim
that they are working to raise the standards of the community to
a higher standard. This is why Sandel's discussion of "the civil
rights movement of the 1950s to the mid-1960s" as "the finest
expression of republican politics in our time" is so strained (DD,
pp. 348-49). There were indeed republican elements to the
movement, such as "acting collectively to shape the public world"
(DD, p. 348). This collective action required a sense of solidarity,
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of course, but the appeal to solidarity was surely not sufficient for
the success of the movement. Solidarity with whom? With other
AfricanAmericans?If MartinLutherKing and the other civil rights
leaders could invoke racial solidarity in an attempt to defeat
segregation, so could the segregationists in an attempt to defend
it. Solidarity with all Alabamans, or Georgians, the majority of
whom wanted to keep things as they were? Solidarity with all
citizens of the United States, for many of whom the events in the
South were simply an irritating distraction? To make their case,
the leaders of the civil rights movement had to move beyond
solidarity to universal claims, as Sandel acknowledges, "about
vindicating individual rights against the prejudices of local
communities, about respecting persons as persons, regardless of
their race, religion, or other particularcharacteristics"(DD, p. 348).
They also had to argue that no one had an obligation to obey laws
that denied him or her these basic rights, member of the
community or not. They needed, in short, a theory of political
obligation that went beyond membership and solidarity to
considerations of rights, justice, and fair play.
When he turns to the discussion of his pluralist version of
republicanism in the last chapter of Democracy'sDiscontent,Sandel
lays particular stress on the need for "multiply-situated selves"
and "multiply-encumbered citizens" to weigh and balance the
various claims made on them as best they can. "The civic virtue
distinctive to our time," he remarks, "is the capacity to negotiate
our way among the sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting
obligations that claim us, and to live with the tension to which
multiple loyalties give rise" (DD, p. 350). Failure to sustain this
tension will send us either into fundamentalism, for those who
seek the certainty of simple answers, or into the formlessness of
"storyless selves, unable to weave the various strands of their
identity into a coherent whole" (DD, p. 350). If these are the only
alternatives, then Sandel is right to tell us that we must learn to
sustain the tension of multiple loyalties. But we must also
recognize that people living with this tension must still make
choices and decisions, and the sense of obligation is not, as I have
argued, always sufficient to the task. We do indeed need some
sense of what we owe to others, of the unchosen attachments and
memberships that help to make us who we are. But we must also
have some sense of what makes those to whom we are attached
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worthy of our respect, gratitude, and loyalty. Without some
guidance of this kind, we will not be able to determine who is
most worthywhen the difficult choices confront us.
At these times we will need to be able to look beyond or beneath the obligations of membership and solidarity, as those
engaged in the civil rights movement did. We will need principles
that allow us to adapt universal prescriptions to particular circumstances. And we will need to recognize that other people,
including perhaps many we have never known, have made it
possible for us to rise at least a bit above our encumbrances and
to gain a measure of autonomy. To those people we will have an
obligation founded in gratitude and fairness that transcends the
obligations of membership.

Republicanism versus Liberalism?
The procedural republic that has unfolded over the past halfcentury can now be seen as an epic experiment in the claims of liberal
as against republicanpolitical thought. Our present predicament lends
weight to the republican claim that liberty cannot be detached from
self-government and the virtues that sustain it, that the formative
project cannot be dispensed with after all. The procedural republic,
it turns out, cannot secure the liberty it promises because it cannot
inspire the moral and civic engagement self-government requires.
(DD, p. 323; emphasis added)

This passage from the concluding chapter of Democracy's
Discontentneatly expresses the main argument of the book. The
United States began as a country dedicated to republican selfgovernment, but liberalism,with its emphasis on individual rights
and a government neutral with regard to competing conceptions
of the good, has largely supplanted republicanism in the last halfcentury or so. Yet the victory of liberal political theory must be a
hollow one, for the liberalism of the procedural republic "cannot
inspire the moral and civic engagement self-government
requires."Liberalism has won, at least for now, but it will lead us
all to defeat unless republicanism revives and regains
the ascendancy.
For the most part Sandel is careful to direct his attack against
a "version"of liberalism ratherthan liberalism simpliciter.On page
four, for instance, he declares that the "political philosophy by
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which we live is a certain version of liberal political theory." At
one point he even seems to admit the possibility of a "more civicminded liberalism" that "would seek communal provision less
for the sake of distributive justice than for the sake of affirming
the membership and forming the civic identity of rich and
poor alike" (DD, p. 333). But there is no denying that the opposition that informs his book is the opposition of liberalism
to republicanism.
As others have noted, Sandel works so hard to distinguish
republicanism from liberalism historically as well as conceptually
that he produces a highly suspect-first came republicanism, then
came liberalism-and tendentious account of American history.20
This account is particularly surprising in light of this statement
from one of the sources Sandel cites: "Logically, it may be
inconsistent to be simultaneously liberal and classical [i.e.,classical
republican]. Historically, it was not."21
I am less concerned with Sandel's history, however, than with
his assumption that the claims of liberal must be set against those
of republican political thought. Rather than make this assumption, we should pause to consider whether republicanism and
liberalism share enough features to make a hybrid possible,
perhaps in the form of a "more civic-minded liberalism" that
might be called republican liberalism. I believe that they do, and
I believe that Sandel's position rests on an implicit appeal to such
a hybrid. As his discussion of the civil rights movement indicates,
for instance, the political activity and attitudes that Sandel
endorses embrace both republican and liberal convictions.
Individual rights, fair play, and tolerance are as integral to his
vision of the good polity as the sense of community and civic
duty. When he insists on distinguishing "the claims of liberal as
against republican political thought," though, he threatens to
undercut his own position. At the least his sharp distinction makes
opponents of liberals who otherwise might be persuaded to see
20. See the reviews of Democracy's
Discontentby Susan Okin (AmericanPolitical
ScienceReview91 [1997]:440-42) and Mark Hulliung (TheResponsiveCommunity
7 [1997]:68-72).
21. Lance Banning, "JeffersonianIdeology Revisited: Liberal and Classical
Ideas in the New American Republic," Williamand Mary Quarterly43 (1986):12.
Sandel cites this article in note 33, p. 372.
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how their own commitments require them to accord greatervalue
and attention to republican principles.
The way to avoid these problems, as I have said, is to look to
a hybrid of republicanism and liberalism. But is such a hybrid
possible as well as desirable? I shall now try to show that it is.
If liberalism is a form of political thinking that places the
greatest value on individual rights and personal autonomy,
republicanism is frequently distinguished from it as a rival theory
that accords the greatest value to civic virtue and responsible selfgovernment.22Autonomy and civic virtue are often taken to be at
odds with one anotherbecause personal autonomy requirespeople
to look inward so that they may govern themselves, while civic
virtue demands that they look outward and do what they can to
promote the common good. The two aredifferent from each other,
of course; they are even in tension with each other at times. But
they appear to be incompatible only to those who conceive of
autonomy as a purely individualistic notion, as Sandel does, and
of civic virtue as a strictly collectivist or communitarian ideal.
But this is to overlook the important ways in which the two
concepts, one supposedly liberal and the other republican,connect
with each other.
In classical republican thought, civic virtue-the disposition
to place the good of the community above one's personal goodcontains three primary elements: the fear of corruption, the hatred
of dependence, and the desire for liberty.
Corruption could take the passive form of shirking one's civic
duties in favor of indolence or the life of luxury, or it could take
the active form of advancing one's personal interests at the expense of the common good, as when ambition and avarice tempt
someone to overthrow the rule of law and establish a tyranny in
its place.
The second ingredient of republican virtue, the fear of dependence, follows from the Aristotelian conception (The Politics,
1283b42-1284a3)of the citizen as someone who rules and is ruled
in turn. The person who is utterly dependent on another person
may be ruled, but is surely in no position to rule. The rule of law
is essential, therefore,as a means of avoiding personaldependence.
In a government of laws, not of men, in the classical formulation,
22. The following discussion is adapted from my Civic Virtues, pp. 13-18.
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the citizen is subject to laws, not to the demands and whims of
rulers who act without restraint. The republican defense of private property as a way of guaranteeing that the citizen's home
and livelihood will not depend completely on the vagaries and
interests of another also reflects this fear of dependence. Some
republican thinkers, such as Harrington and Rousseau, have also
suggested that property should be distributed in such a way as to
prevent anyone from being so wealthy as to render other citizens
dependent-a worry about the consequences of civic inequality
reflected in the last chapter of Democracy'sDiscontent.
This fear of dependence leads to the third element of the
republican conception of civic virtue: independence, or liberty.23
The virtuous citizen must be free, but not simply free to go his or
her own way. Instead, the citizen is free when he or she participates
in the government of his or her community. As part of the
community, the citizen will recognize that the government of
common affairs is more or less directly self-government. If selfgovernment requires the occasional sacrifice of one's personal
interests, so be it, for the sacrifice is necessary to preserve the
liberties of the citizen of a self-governing polity.
These features of republican virtue are all present in the
republicanism of Democracy'sDiscontent.The question to consider
now is whether the revival of civic virtue so conceived is
compatible with the supposedly liberal desire for personal
autonomy or altogether at odds with it. The autonomous person
adopts the principles by which he or she will live, which implies
some degree of critical reflection on the principles available. With
civic virtue, however, the emphasis is on acting, perhaps without
reflection, to promote the common good. The unquestioning
soldier who makes "the ultimate sacrifice" on behalf of his or her
country provides a striking example. It is easy enough to see, then,
how autonomy and civic virtue can seem to be at odds, for it is
certainlypossible for someone to exhibit civic virtue without being
autonomous, just as it is possible for an autonomous person to
act in a thoroughly selfish manner.
23. For a valuable account of and argument for the republican conception of
A Theoryof Freedom
liberty as "nondomination," see Philip Pettit, Republicanism:
and Government(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), esp. part 1. Note also Pettit's
"Reworking Sandel's Republicanism," TheJournalof Philosophy95 (1998):73-96.
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But this is to say that civic virtue and personal autonomy are
different from each other and that they sometimes tug us in different directions, not that they are incompatible. Properly
understood, autonomy and civic virtue turn out to be related concepts that can and should complement each other. Another look
at the three principal elements of republican virtue should begin
to make their compatibility clear.
First, the republicans' fear of corruption is largely a fear of
human weakness. Indolence and love of luxury, ambition and
avarice-these are vices that constantly beckon people to forsake
their civic duties and disregard the claims of the common good.
Staving off corruption requires mixed government and the rule
of law and, according to some republicans, even the rotation of
public offices among the citizenry and measures to prevent the
concentration of wealth and property in the hands of a few. But
these devices will never eradicate the threat of corruption, which
stems from selfish and ultimately self-defeating desires implanted
in human nature. The best hope lies in "the education of desire"
or, more optimistically, in an appeal to "the compulsion of duty."24
To teach people to hold their passions in check and to cultivate
devotion to the common good is indeed to engage in a "formative project,"as Sandel puts it. But it is also to help them achieve
a form of self-government. In this respect, civic virtue and autonomy have something in common.
The second element in republican virtue exhibits another
connection with autonomy. In this case, the republican distinction
between dependence and independence has a direct counterpart
in the distinction between heteronomy and autonomy. The
connection is perhaps clearest in the works of Rousseau, who
inspired Immanuel Kant, the philosopher most often identified
with the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy-and
forebearof the Kantianor deontological liberalswho have brought
us, according to Sandel, into the procedural republic. In Emile,
Rousseau draws a distinction between
two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature,
and dependence on men, which is from society. Dependence on things,

24. Shelley Burtt, "The Good Citizen's Psyche: On the Psychology of Civic
Virtue,"Polity 23 (1990):23-38.
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since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and
engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is without order,
engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are mutually
corrupted. If there is any means of remedying this ill in society, it is to
substitute law for man and to arm the general will with a real strength
superior to the action of every particular will.25

Here Rousseau proclaims that the only way to overcome "dependence on men," and thus to promote freedom, is to rely on the
impartial rule of law and the general will. If the rule of law frees
people from dependence on others, they will be free to make laws
in accordance with the general will that they share as citizens.
This freedom, as Rousseau says in the SocialContract(BookI, Chapter 8), is "moral liberty," that is, living in accordance with laws
that one prescribes for oneself. Freeing people from dependence
on others is thus necessary if they are to exercise autonomy.
The connection between autonomy and civic virtue is perhaps
most obvious with regardto the third element of republicanvirtue:
the idea that liberty is participation in government and therefore
is self-government. Since autonomy means self-government, one
might say that the concept of civic virtue entails a commitment to
autonomy, in some sense of the word. Again, this commitment is
probably clearest in Rousseau's writings, as in the fundamental
problem he sets out to solve in the SocialContract:"'Find a form
of association that defends and protects the person and goods of
each associate with all the common force, and by means of which
each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and
remains as free as before."'26For Rousseau, in fact, it seems not
only that civic virtue entails self-government, but that autonomy
is possible only when civic virtue prevails. Unless the general will
of the citizentakes precedence over the particular will of the man,
to use his terms, no one can experience moral liberty.
From the perspective of the republican conception of civic
virtue, in short, autonomy and civic virtue are far from
incompatible ideals. The same result emerges from a brief analysis
of the concept of autonomy. Autonomy "has to be worked for,"
which leads some philosophers to regard it as "a characteridealor
25. Rousseau, Emile,trans.Allan Bloom (New York:Basic Books, 1979),p. 85.
26. Rousseau, Social Contract,ed. Roger D. Masters and trans. Judith R.
Masters (New York:St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 53.
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virtue."27But autonomy is not something that one can achieve
solely through individual effort. It may have to be worked for,
but it also has to be cultivated and developed. An infant may have
the innate capacity to lead a self-governed life, but this capacity
must be nourished and developed by others before he or she can
ever hope to be autonomous. Recognizing this, the autonomous
person should also recognize a duty of some sort to those whose
help has made and continues to make it possible for him or her to
lead a reasonably self-governed life-a debt that might be called
an "obligation of membership," or "solidarity,"perhaps. If this
help sometimes takes the form of more or less impersonal public
assistance or cooperation, then the corresponding duty is a civic
duty. Thus the autonomous person has a reason to exhibit civic
virtue, at least when the community or polity as a whole plays a
significant part in fostering personal autonomy.
Perhaps the best way to put the point is to say that autonomy
and civic virtue are complementary because both concepts help
us to see how independence is related to dependence. The person
who is completely dependent on others cannot be independent,
yet even the independent person remains dependent on others in
in other words, and a proper
various ways. We are interdependent,
and
of
civic
virtue leads us to recogunderstanding
autonomy
nize and appreciate this basic fact of life.
Interdependent people do not always agree with one another,
however, and their relationships are sometimes strained by
tension. This is also true of autonomy and civic virtue. They
sometimes pull in different directions, with autonomy leaning
toward individual rights and civic virtue toward public
responsibility. Yet even this tension is healthy. When autonomy
pulls too hard in an individualistic direction, the appeal to civic
virtue reminds us that both the development and the exercise of
autonomy require the assistance and cooperation of others; when
appeals to civic virtue threaten to jeopardize individual rights,
the claims of autonomy remind us that the body politic ought to
be a cooperative enterprise composed of individuals who have a
right to lead a self-governed life. In this way the tension between
autonomy and civic virtue leads to a healthy balance. This is the
27. Robert Young, PersonalAutonomy:BeyondPositive and Negative Liberty
(London: Croom and Helm, 1986), p. 9.
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kind of balance reflected in the attitude of citizens who are willing
to do their part for the common good as long as others are willing
to do theirs. These citizens know that they and the other members
of the body politic are interdependent: their cooperation helps to
enhance others' autonomy, just as the cooperation of others helps
to enhance theirs. They have a reason to exhibit civic virtue, then,
at least when the body politic as a whole plays a significant part
in fostering personal autonomy.
The Sandelian republicaims at achieving a balance of this kind.
But such a balance requires a recognition of the common ground
that republicanism and liberalism share, and this ground will go
unnoticed by those who only see "the claims of liberal as against
republican political thought."

Conclusion
Michael Sandel is right. Republican self-government does
require "a formative politics ... that cultivates in citizens the
qualities of character that self-government requires" (DD, p. 6).
He is also right to remind us that others throughout American
history have thought so, especially those concerned with "the
political economy of citizenship" whose preoccupation was the
question, "what economic arrangements are most hospitable to
self-government?" (DD, p. 124).And he is right to warn us against
those who believe that the state must be neutral with regard to
conceptions of the good life.28But he is wrong, as I hope I have
shown, when he insists that we can only make matters right by
rejecting liberalism in favor of republicanism.
To take this position is to ignore the ways in which liberalism
and republicanism complement one another,as I have just argued.
It is also to ignore those liberals who have also acknowledged the
need for "a formative politics" that a commitment to neutrality
cannot sustain, such as Joseph Raz, William Galston, Thomas
Spragens, Shelley Burtt, and George Sher.29

28. Or so I argue in Civic Virtues,chap. 11.
29. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986);
William Galston, LiberalPurposes:Goods,Virtues,and Diversityin the LiberalState
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Thomas Spragens, "The
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More important, Sandel's persistent tendency to oppose
republicanism to liberalism undercuts his own position. Perhaps
the unencumbered self cannot sustain republicangovernment, but
neither can a thoroughly encumbered self; perhaps an individual
bereft of a sense of obligation will not act to overcome injustice,
but neither will the person who cannot see beyond the obligations
of membership and solidarity. The United States may indeed be
in search of a public philosophy, and the one it needs may indeed
resemble Sandelian republicanism. If we are to find that
philosophy, however, we must resist Sandel's attempt to divorce
republican from liberalpolitical thought and look instead for ways
to revive the republican spirit of republican liberalism.
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